, provided that in B2B transactions one of the parties is an SME. 48 Furthermore, account shall be taken of the possibility of an extended personal and territorial scope under Art. 13. 49 Having the Proposal based on an opt-in model provides for a less intrusive measure in order to calm the nerves of some Member States who fear the 'creep' of a European Civil Code.
50
Before the Proposal was published, three models were discussed. The first option was a '28 th regime' 51 which would amount to a separate legal system next to the current 28 44 Wendehorst 2012, p. 9. 45 Wendehorst 2012, p. 10.
46 Art. 4(1) of the Proposed Regulation.
47 Art. 5 of the Proposed Regulation.
48 Art. 7 of the Proposed Regulation.
49 Art. 13(a) of the Proposal gives the Member States the possibility to extend the territorial application of the CESL to include also domestic transactions and Art. 13(b) provides for an option to the Member States to make it applicable also to two large traders.
50 Wendehorst 2012, p. 30-31. 51 At the time the term of a '28 th regime' emerged, the EU counted 27 Member States. As of July 1 st , 2013 the Republic of Croatia has joined the EU. In that sense now reference under that model would appropriately be called the '29 th regime'. of the Rome I Regulation would also have subjected the choice of law to the mandatory provisions of the habitual residence state of the consumer.
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The second model of a self-standing legal order where a choice of it would have led to a derogation from the Rome I Regulation. This option was not favoured due to uncertainty on the appropriate legal basis, the possibility of traders of the so-called 'cherry-picking' of provisions under Art. 6(2) of that Regulation and the risk of parties not being aware of the necessity to make a second choice of law for the areas not covered by the instrument, if the default regime, applicable under Art. 4 of the Rome I Regulation would wanted to be avoided.
54
For all these reasons, the '2nd regime' model was chosen for the optional instrument which provides for the Proposal being envisaged to operate next to national contract laws (similar to the CISG Art. 1(1)(b)).
55
The material scope of the Proposal is set out in Art. 5 of the Regulation, save the exceptions mentioned in Art. 6. The envisaged CESL is to be available for sales contracts (pursuant to the definitions provided in Art. 2), contracts for the supply of digital content (irrespective of whether or not supplied on a tangible medium or contracted for in exchange for a non-monetary compensation) and related service contracts (regardless of agreeing on a separate compensation for it or not).
56
In terms of the scopes of application, a now common provision on the evaluation and review of the instrument is included in Art. 15 of the Proposed Regulation. It provides for the obligation of Member States to supply the Commission with information on the application and the acceptance of the CESL, four years after the application of the Regulation. 57 Furthermore, subsection 2 obliges the Commission to draft a report on the operation of the Proposed Regulation and in particular on the necessity to extend the 
Aims and Objectives Pursued by the European Commission
The harmonization of contract law matters by Directives has been long justified upon the need for consumer protection. This is due to the evident link of it with the Internal Market, such as enhancing consumer confidence and incentivising the entering into crossborder transactions. In turn, consumer confidence is linked to conflict-of-law rules and the necessity of consumers to be able to rely on a uniform, minimum consumer protection, leading to the justification of using Directives to that manner.
59
However, as familiarity with the available rights under Rome I Regulation (especially Art. 6) is not sufficient and consumer confidence was not enhanced to such a degree as envisaged, the way forward was to set aside minimum harmonization measures by
Directives and move towards a (high level) uniform protection which could be achieved by means of a Regulation.
60
The lack of confidence in EU law is just as well an issue for traders as it is for consumers, 
Cross-border trade issues in B2B contracts
The Explanatory Memorandum, which is to be found in the very first part of the Proposal of the Commission, explicitly sets out contract law difference between Member States to be one of the major obstacles to the engagement in cross-border trade by consumers and traders. 64 The Commission stresses that the lack of expansion of businesses to cross-border regions, especially in the case of SMEs, stems from the complexity and costs which have to be 64 Other barriers to trade include inter alia linguistic differences, culture, tax regulations and administrative requirements.
The aspect of higher costs largely relates to the necessity of getting legal advice on the mandatory national provisions on contractual obligations and negotiation costs related to this. 66 The Commission specifically emphasises the disadvantageous position that SMEs find themselves in, due to the costs of taking up cross-border dealings making up a larger part of the overall turnover, compared to large enterprises. 67 They are often disproportionally high and may subvert the value of the transaction itself. Thus, the larger the number of countries trade is directed to by businesses, the more significant are differences in contract laws to such traders. Therefore, a specific focus is laid upon the fostering and strengthening of the position of SMEs on the Internal Market, which has been a long standing objective of the EU.
68
Legal complexity is another component of the issue with varying national contract laws between Member States. The necessity to familiarize and use a foreign national law to expand a business towards that country discourages many parties from engaging in crossborder trade. The complexity and difficulty is even higher in cases where the national law of the targeted foreign market belongs to another legal family, i.e. there are particularly large differences in approaches between common law and civil law systems.
69
An overall result of the lack of active engagement in cross-border trade by many 
Cross-border trade issues in B2C contracts
However, not only traders are discouraged to engage in cross-border trade, the same is true for consumers, although for different reasons. The awareness of private parties of the advantages of shopping in another Member State is not actually absent, however, the uncertainty as to consumer protection and rights in another country disincentivizes such engagement in cross-border shopping.
A major concern of consumers is the availability of remedies in cases a good is not in conformity with the contract or the trader does not perform his obligations properly.
Another example of why consumers often tend to limit their purchases to their domestic market lies in the fact that while making use of e-commerce (i.e. online purchasing portals) so as to find the best prices or offers, consumers are often barred from placing an order through the trader's refusal. The basis of such a rejection to sell or deliver a good is inter alia based on contract law considerations of traders. 
Prime objectives of the Commission
For all the reasons outlined above, the Commission's overall aim of enhancing the functioning of the Internal Market and fostering cross-border trade boils down to taking away the complexity of diversity and lowering transaction costs through a uniform set of rules and eliminating the need for legal advice on each foreign national system. 73 The personal scope of the Proposal is to be found in Art. 7 of the Proposed Regulation setting out the necessary criteria for the availability of the CESL for a choice of application to a contractual relationship.
77
The Proposed CESL, as it stands now, is only available for contractual relationships where at least one of the parties is a 'trader' in according to Art. 7(1) and furthermore, the 'seller' of the goods or digital content must be a trader 78 if the other party is a consumer (B2C). The CESL Proposal itself makes constant differentiation between situations where the customer is a consumer and transactions where the customer is a trader in the sense of Art. 2 of the Proposed Regulation. As there is nothing in between, it is apparent that a loophole in the provisions exists as parties who are neither consumers nor traders in the strict sense, fall outside the scope of personal application, i.e. non-profit organizations or higher education institutions.
79
However, one significant limitation is imposed for cases where both parties are traders, for the proposed CESL is only available for such B2B transactions, where one of the traders is to be qualified as a SME. 80 Subsection two furthermore, sets out the criteria for determining a SME for the purposes of the Proposal. The consequences flowing from this limitation are now analysed to justify the necessity of abandoning it.
Definition of an SME -Characterization Requirements
The opting-into the CESL, in B2B transactions, is largely dependent on the determination 75 It must be noted however, that de facto choice of the applicable law in consumer contracts will usually be limited to the trader, for the consumer may encounter a 'take it or leave it' approach from the side of the trader. of the parties characteristics and the necessity of one of them to be regarded as an SME.
The complex and detailed requirements which need to be fulfilled are set out below.
In order to be classified as an SME, the party in question must satisfy the criteria below The inclusion of the annual balance sheet as another criterion of determination has been regarded as necessary by the Commission already in the Recommendation, for businesses in the trade and distribution sector have usually higher turnovers than the manufacturing traders, simply by the character of the business. Thus, such an objective criterion reflecting the overall wealth of the enterprise, the annual balance sheet ceiling of 43 million Euros was added to the total turnover measure.
85
The relevant time period of assessment relates to the annually calculated accounting period latest approved. 86 In regard to changes within an accounting period to the previous 
SME requirements -Issues Related to Sub-Entities
An obvious difficulty arises with the definition of businesses which consist of a number of sub-entities. 89 Taking the Commission Recommendation as a guideline, the key notion for determination is the 'autonomous enterprise'
90
, which shall be neither a 'linked' not a 'partner' enterprise.
To be regarded as the former ('linked enterprise'), a business must show one of these The later kind ('partner enterprises') are defined as those which do not show any of the above mentioned relationships but rather, the enterprise in question holds (exclusively or jointly with other linked enterprises) a minimum of 25% of the capital or voting rights of another business. An exception to being considered a partner enterprise is available for a number of privileged investors for whom the minimum percentage does not count as long as the criteria for linked enterprises are not fulfilled by them. Such privileged investors may be i.e. universities, regional development funds or autonomous local authorities with fewer than 5.000 inhabitants and an annual budget ceiling of 10 million Euros. The Proposed CESL Regulation provides for the possibility for Member States to expand the scope of personal application to include all transactions between traders (B2B) (Art.
13(b) of the Proposed Regulation). This option tries to strike a balance in regard to the decision of limiting the personal scope for contracts between traders to situations, where at least one of the parties is an SME
92
, for the sake of political acceptance, subsidiarity and proportionality. 93 As will be argued later on, the justification of the limitation on the grounds of subsidiarity and proportionality is unfounded.
The incentive for Member States to actually make use of the possibility under Art.
13(b) is most probably not the desire to make it available also to two large enterprises.
Rather, the motivation lies in trying to eliminate the embarrassment of domestic traders connected to the need to disclose the headcount and financials (annual turnovers or balance sheets pursuant to Art. 7) which makes the choice of the CESL very unattractive.
94
In contrast to the result stemming from extending the territorial scope under Art. 13(a), choosing to make it applicable to all B2B transactions enables all traders from other Member State to make use of the CESL even if the requirement of Art. 7, one being an SME, is not present. 
Proposal for Necessary Changes in the Personal Scope
For all of the negative consequences mentioned above it is clear that having restrictions onto the personal scope of application of the Proposed Common European Sales Law is far from ideal. Going back to the very aims of the Commission of taking away the complexity of transnational contracting and enhancing legal certainty to foster the cross-border sale of goods, an evident lack of achievement of them is to be noted. It has already been outlined how complex the characterization of falling within the definition of an SME for the purposes of the Proposed CESL is.
The same is true for the apparent loophole of not including juridical persons which are not involved in commercial activities such as universities. This is especially problematic in e-commerce scenarios and for large traders who would like to opt for the CESL as they would have the burden of proof concerning the availability of the CESL as a choice. Striving towards the enhancement of the functioning of the Internal Market depends on the attractiveness of the Proposal to businesses. Therefore, it is crucial to abandon the limitation of one party having to be an SME in business-to-business transactions to be able to choose the CESL. As has been shown, there is in fact a practical need for the extension to all B2B transactions and, as this restriction calls into question the suitability of the achievement of the aims of the Commission, the justifications based on the proportionality and subsidiarity 116 principles are invalid.
The extension of the personal scope to include all B2B and B2C transactions should not be too difficult as most of the provisions of the Proposed CESL are formulated in a rather general manner and would require only small corrections.
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Leaving the Proposal as it stands now, with the personal scope being narrowed down, risks the success of the Proposal and therefore could lead to all the work on a CESL to get lost in the shuffle.
Ratione Loci -Limitations and Consequences
The limited applicability of the Proposed CESL to cross-border transactions only, is claimed to be appropriate as this is the area where regulation of the Internal Market is needed most and it is the 'least' intrusive means. 118 However, the following sections by way of analysis, of the consequences of making the CESL only applicable to cross-border transactions, will prove the undesirability of such a limitation.
Current Territorial Scope
The Proposal for a Common European Sales law, as it stands now, is only applicable to sale of goods transactions which have a cross-border element and satisfy the minimum EU In consumer contracts, the determination of a cross-border element is made upon the habitual residence or address provided by the consumer being in another Member State than the trader's habitual residence. The address may refer to the billing address, the delivery address or the residence address of the consumer.
Determination of Cross-Border Scenarios
In accordance with Art. 4(1), the optional instrument is only applicable to cross-border transactions. A distinction is made between contracts between traders and consumer contracts. The former is set out in subsection 2 of this Article where a cross-border relationship exist where the 'habitual residences' of the traders are located in two different counties of which one must be a Member State of the EU. 122 The determination of the cross-border element is solely to be based upon the time of agreement on the usage of the proposed CESL and any future changes to places of residence do not have an impact on the validity of the cross-border requirement.
123
The Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Aquis 124 provided for three options for the measure to be adopted: cross-border and domestic, only cross-border and limited to distance selling for both domestic and cross-border. The Commission favoured the first option due to the difficulty of defining what would constitute a 'cross-border' scenario, as well as it would lead to legal fragmentation which is contrary to the objective pursued.
125
The Aquis Group has also voiced its support for the abandonment of the cross-border limitation as they perceive the establishment and verification of the place of residence of a consumer on a web-based platform as being technically to difficult. This follows the reasoning that the billing address may vary from the delivery address (especially often to be found in border regions) and in order to discern the cross-border element, the disclosure of the place of residence of the consumer must be required, before the applicable terms of contract could be determined.
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Despite this, the Proposal limits the territorial application to cross-border transactions only and the Drafters did not take into account the concerns which have been voiced as to the difficulty of determination.
The Concept of 'Habitual Residence'
The term 'habitual residence' is used for the determination of the cross-border element for both, transactions between traders as well as consumer contracts. This is a well know concept in B2B relations and can also be found in Art. 19 of the Rome I Regulation which makes a reference to Art, 22 of the Brussels I Regulation defining the central place of administration as being the trader's 'habitual residence'. 127 Nevertheless, it is used in a highly inconsistent way in Annex I were reference is often made to the 'place of business'
rather than habitual residence of the trader. 
Cross-Border Requirement consequences
In B2C scenarios the requirement of having a cross-border element is determined on a much more subjective basis and is also more lenient compared to B2B transactions. 144 If however the Member State which chose for the extension will not have a restriction to make the extension available only to domestic parties, also two foreign based parties will be able to make a contract under the CESL by choosing that Member States law as being the applicable law under applicable conflict-of-law rules. The restriction on the territorial application also triggers legal uncertainty, especially in e-commerce cases where the establishment of the other parties' habitual residence is difficult. In example, the domain name is not determinative of the habitual residence of a business. 148 It may well be that a trader has the domain name which would refer to one
Member State but his principal place of administration would be located in another. In the same sense, the location of technical equipment used for contracting or e-mail address used do not determine the territorial applicability requirement.
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The intricacy of satisfying the cross-border requirement, especially by SMEs, results in having to apply (at least) two legal regimes, one for domestic transactions and of e.g. the CESL for cross-border scenarios if the Member State does not extend the scope of application to include domestic transactions. 150 Thus, the possibility to lower transaction costs through using a single set of rules for the sale of goods and therefore also added simplicity and lower transaction costs is only possible for large traders.
in the GATT 1947, 158 In addition to that it is hard to see why the EU would want to put its traders at a competitive disadvantage compared to third state traders when contracting with consumers. 163 Again, it should be at the heart of the EU legislator to avoid creating legislation with such effects and rather make EU traders more competitive on the global market. 154; 33 ILM 1144 , Marrakesh: 15.04.1994 . 160 Basedow 2012a 161 It should nevertheless be borne in mind that the applicability of EU law may only be guaranteed in courts of Member States, not necessarily in third countries which limits legal certainty with regards to transactions with foreign parties. Incoming B2C transactions from a foreign trader to an EU consumer will be guaranteed by virtue of Art. 6(1) Rome I Regulation. In outgoing transactions form an EU trader to a foreign consumer, where there is an absence of a choice of law of a Member State, Art. 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation will necessarily lead to the third country jurisdiction which in turn will decide on the applicability of the CESL. In addition to that, Art. 6(2) will also prohibit the derogation from mandatory national consumer protection law, thereby superseding the CESL if necessary. Having established that, recital 12 of the Proposal is incorrect in stating that 'Art. 6(2) of Rome I Regulation has no practical importance for the CESL' and legal uncertainty will not be overcome in transactions with third states. (See also: Basedow 2012a, p. 38-39; Basedow et al. 2011, p. 30 and 33 The success of the Proposal is jeopardized by having very restricted personal and territorial scope applications. If a simplification of the legal environment, the lowering of related transaction costs for cross-border trade and legal certainty are not achieved, the added value is in effect missing and therefore, the attractiveness of the envisaged instrument to businesses is largely taken away. Consequently, the efforts of over two decades of debates and work by a number of actors involved in the process, ranging from the EU legislature and politicians, stakeholders to legal academics, is in vain as the Proposed CESL will not be opted-for by businesses and is 'doomed' to become largely irrelevant to transnational trade in the Internal Market.
The contemplation of the necessary scopes should be based upon actual and potential needs of the market and commercial practices in lieu of holding on to the competence rivalry between Member States and the European Union. The 'Eurocentric' view on EU legislation especially in the area of having to apply and regulate cross-border situations only is outdated and should be abandoned for the sake of actually encouraging crossborder trade, especially also for SMEs, and eliminating another obstacle to the Internal Market of the European Union.
The release of restrictions for the envisaged instrument and including all B2B transactions, without the need to characterize the other contracting party as being a large enterprise or SME is necessary. It would not only make the CESL more appealing but also safe SMEs from embarrassment. In addition to that, the wording of the Proposal should be changed as not to exclude parties which are neither traders nor consumers in the strict sense, such as non-profit organizations or universities. Such an extension should not be too difficult as most provisions of the CESL are drafted in a rather general manner.
Furthermore, it is crucial to make the Proposed CESL applicable to all transactions, including domestic ones, will be the first step towards making the desired Common European Sales Law work in practice. Only the elimination of the restriction of one party in B2B contracts having to be an SME will achieve the cost saving aims, will make the legal environment simpler and will enhance legal certainty by making a complex characterization of places of habitual residence redundant.
The problem of mixed contracts in the territorial sense would also become irrelevant by extending the scope to include all sale of goods contracts. The aim of fostering cross-border transactions of SMEs in particular, can only be granted if they will be able to make use of a single set of terms and conditions to contract with all their customers and not being disadvantaged vis-à-vis large traders who are usually able to channel transactions through their foreign branches.
The minimum EU link requirement of one party having to be habitually resident in the EU should be abandoned as it neither brings about an added value nor contributes to simplicity of the instrument. Making the CESL available for all parties to choose for, regardless of their origin, will advertise EU law and will generate a 'level playing field' in the competitive global market. An additional side benefit could also be achieved through the promotion of European legal services such as arbitration tribunals and creating a model for the modernization and reformation of national contract law regimes, also fostering regulatory competition.
The justification attempts of the Commission with regard to the limitations which have been imposed upon the personal and territorial scopes of application largely relate to the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. However, it is clear that those principles shall not restrict and undermine the very aim of the objective sought by the measure, which is the enhancement of the functioning of the Internal Market, including the elimination of legal frontiers.
Leaving the Proposal as it stands out ultimately leads to shooting far off target and missing the chance of eliminating another barrier to the Internal Market of the EU, at least for the next years (if not decades) before a new and improved attempt to tackle the issues on differentiated national contract laws could emerge.
The consistent neglect of an appropriate consideration of those 'foundations' led to the current Proposal for a Common European Sales Law to become a 'house of cards', which will not be able to stand its ground in the Internal Market and will collapse by failing to provide for an added value and achieving the initial goals of the Commission.
